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Abstract 
The main purpose of this article is to provide an in-depth review of Andrew Feenberg’s Technosystem: 
The Social Life of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). To this end, the analysis 
is divided into two parts. The first part gives an overview of its thematic structure and elucidates its 
key arguments. The second part discusses its most controversial aspects and grapples with its 
principal weaknesses and limitations. By way of conclusion, the article argues that Feenberg’s 
book demon- strates the pivotal role that the technosystem plays in shaping contemporary 
society. 
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Introduction 
The main purpose of this article is to provide an in-depth review of Andrew Feenberg’s 
Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason1 (2017). To this end, the analysis is divided into two 
parts. The first part gives an overview of its thematic structure and elucidates its key arguments. 
The second part discusses its most controversial aspects and grapples with its principal weak- 
nesses and limitations. By way of conclusion, the article argues that Feenberg’s book demon- 
strates the pivotal role that the technosystem plays in shaping contemporary society. 
 
I. Thematic structure and key arguments 
Feenberg’s book is divided into a Preface,2 an Introduction,3 three Parts,4 and a Con- 
clusion.5 Furthermore, it contains an extensive Notes6 section as well as both a Name 
Index7 and a Subject Index.8 
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Part I 
Part I is entitled ‘Method’.9 It comprises three chapters (Chapters 1–3). These provide an 
introduction to ‘critical constructivism’ (CC), making a case for its relevance to the 
analysis of what Feenberg calls ‘the technosystem’. Feenberg considers the intellectual 
contributions of a large pool of prominent scholars: Karl Marx and Michel Foucault; 
Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse; Gilbert Simondon and 
various thinkers associated with two currents of science and technology studies (STS), 
namely social constructivism and actor–network theory (ANT). 
These thinkers and approaches share the following assumption: while ‘modern soci- 
eties are organized around rational institutions and artefacts’,10 rationality is never 
‘singular and pure’11 but always shaped by socio-historically variable conditions. Given 
the ‘context-bound realization of rationality’,12 technological design – far from being 
reducible to a mere product of scientific principles – is influenced by social forces, which 
play a central ‘role in the definition, selection, and application of those principles’.13 For 
instance, social movements – although they have been excluded from participating in 
traditional types of the technosystem – are increasingly pushing for inclusion, as illu- 
strated in the rise of environmentalism. Just as critical theorists highlight the importance 
of social struggles, Simondon’s concept of ‘concretization’14 offers an empirically sub- 
stantiated framework for exploring the multiple factors allowing for ‘technical prog- 
ress’,15 notably in terms of its profound impact on the development of human life forms. 
Combining contextualist and constructivist understandings of rationality, Feenberg pro- 
poses a critical philosophy of technology, insisting on the historically situated consti- 
tution of social arrangements and, thus, on ‘the limits of the rational organization of 
modern society’.16 Feenberg’s account exposes not only the opportunities arising from 
technology, but also its contradictions and perils, especially those that manifest them- 
selves in social pathologies. 
Chapter 1 – entitled ‘Marx after Foucault’17 – suggests that the latter’s critical studies 
of ‘technical disciplines such as criminology and psychiatry’18 permit us to cast new 
light on the former’s understanding of capitalism. Such a perspective, according to 
Feenberg, enables us to reinterpret Marx’s approach and, crucially, to transcend the 
rather narrow economic focus of his later writings, thereby overcoming some of its 
major shortcomings. Feenberg develops this argument around five themes19: (1) Marx’s 
critique of the irrationality of capitalism is complemented by a sustained critique of 
capitalist rationality. (2) Marx’s conception of the ‘concrete’ object, defined as a com- 
bination of manifold determinations, can be integrated into a genealogy of technosystem 
design. (3) Marx’s discussion of the relation between meaning and economic function is 
applied to contexts in which objects serve a particular role. (4) Marx’s dialectic of ‘real 
subsumption’ and proletarian resistance is generalized in a theory of co-production and 
participant interests. (5) Marx’s understanding of working-class consciousness and 
socialism acquires new significance when compared to Foucault’s notions of ‘subjecti- 
fication’ and ‘governmentality’. To be clear, Feenberg does not contend that Foucault 
was a ‘Marxist’ or that Marx was a ‘pre-Foucauldian’. Rather, he asserts that by cross- 
fertilizing Marxian and Foucauldian thought it becomes possible to grasp the intricacies 
of the capitalist technosystem. 
 3 
 
 
Chapter 2 – entitled ‘Critical Constructivism’20 – examines the relation of CC to its 
two intellectual cornerstones – the critical theory (CT) of the Frankfurt School and early 
work in STS. Drawing on social constructivism and ANT, STS takes issue with ‘posi- 
tivist and determinist ideologies’21 that appear to leave little, if any, ‘place for demo- 
cratic control of technology’22 in advanced societies. CC, CT, and STS reject the idea of 
a ‘pure’, ‘value-free’, and ‘universal’ technology, while maintaining that it is both 
possible and desirable to develop ‘an explicit theory of democratic interventions into 
the technosystem’.23 CC is not intended to serve as a rival or radical alternative to STS. 
Rather, it is meant to be ‘an invitation to open the field to a wider range of philosophical 
and social theories of modernity’.24 Before the rise of STS, the social study of technol- 
ogy was linked – almost exclusively – to ‘Marxism, pragmatism, Heideggerian phenom- 
enology, and various sociological theories of modernity’.25 These approaches emphasize 
the intimate relationship between technology and society, underscoring that the devel- 
opment of the latter is profoundly shaped by the evolution of the former, and vice versa. 
In this respect, the study of technology is marked by several paradigmatic oppositions: 
optimism versus pessimism, voluntarism versus determinism, processualism versus 
structuralism, interpretivism versus positivism, constructivism versus realism – to men- 
tion only a few. Feenberg’s CC is an attempt to bring together key insights from see- 
mingly disconnected, if not irreconcilable, intellectual traditions – such as CT, STS, and 
Foucauldian genealogy.26 Such a multiperspectival endeavour permits us to comprehend 
that complex types of domination, which are embedded in technologically advanced 
forms of action coordination, can be regarded ‘as a contingent social achievement, rather 
than as an essential consequence of rationality as such’.27 Based on this premise, CC 
highlights the dynamic involvement of everyday actors in conflicts over the place of 
technology in contemporary society.28 
Chapter 3 – entitled ‘Concretizing Simondon and Constructivism’29 – discusses the 
main contributions of STS to CC. This chapter is ‘something of a manifesto for a more 
politically informed approach within STS’,30 making a number of methodological sug- 
gestions. It builds on Simondon’s classic writings on the philosophy of technology,31 
which – although, admittedly, they are less well known in Anglophone academia – are a 
crucial reference point in the works of other prominent scholars,32 such as Bruno 
Latour,33 Gilles Deleuze,34 and Bernard Stiegler.35 Inspired by Simondon’s studies, 
Feenberg reminds us of the deep ambivalence of technology, as illustrated in the ‘famil- 
iar dilemma of uncritical celebration and purely negative critique’,36 unconditional 
endorsement and categorical condemnation, techno-fanaticism and techno-fatalism. 
Conservative philosophers a` la Martin Heidegger  – since  they are  deeply  suspicious 
of technology, especially of its unrestrained developments – advocate some kind of 
‘spiritual redemption in opposition to a technology-based lifestyle’.37 By contrast, pro- 
gressive thinkers a` la Marcuse – rather than reducing technology to a merely systemic 
force of alienation and domination – insist on its empowering, if not emancipatory, 
potential.38 Discarding both fatalistic and idealistic notions of technology, Feenberg 
makes a case for Simondon’s view that ‘the way forward is to better integrate technology 
with human beings and nature’.39 On this account, technological and civilizational 
developments are inextricably linked and ultimately driven by the purposive, coopera- 
tive, and creative capacities of human actors. In this regard, Simondon’s ‘theory of 
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concretization’ draws an important distinction between ‘technicity’ and ‘utility’: the 
former defines ‘what makes technology technical’40 and is present in all technical 
devices and systems; the latter designates technology’s ‘relation to human needs’.41 
Convinced that ‘[c]ontemporary struggles over technology are profoundly politi-  
cal’,42 Feenberg identifies two interrelated, but distinct, types of progress: technical  
and normative.43 Just as it would be a mistake  to reduce  one  to the  other, it  would  
be erroneous to pretend they can be understood in isolation from each other. An 
important difference between these two forms of progress,  however, is the  follow- 
ing: whereas normative progress is reversible, technical progress is irreversible. 
 
 
Part II 
Part II is entitled ‘Application’.44 It comprises only one chapter, entitled ‘The Internet in 
Question’45 (Chapter 4). It provides an empirical application of socio-constructivist 
methodology to contemporary debates on recent and possible future developments of 
the Internet. A central question explored in this chapter is whether or not ‘market 
rationality’ and ‘communicative rationality’ can harmoniously coexist on the Internet.46 
At the core of global digital communication technologies, there is a tension between 
these two forms of rationality – a source of concern to which one may add the antinomy 
between ‘instrumental rationality’ and ‘substantive rationality’.47 Its internal contradic- 
tions notwithstanding, the Internet remains an important public space, in which debates 
and controversies shaping society take place.48 The Internet, however, has several pro- 
blematic aspects: 
It fragments and polarizes public life to the degree that it promotes the emergence 
of ‘echo chambers in which individuals never contact anyone with dissenting 
views’.49 
It is ‘defined by narcissistic self-advertisement and business’,50 serving the self- 
promotion of both individual and collective actors motivated by a variety of 
vested interests. 
It is a crucial medium for the exercise of systemic power. At the economic level, it 
is permeated by capitalist market forces, epitomized in ‘the dispiriting commer- 
cialism of Facebook and Google’.51 At the political level, it can be used for 
influencing, if not controlling, public opinion – both in liberal and in authoritarian 
societies. 
It is a tool of mass surveillance. The powerful role of ‘corporate and government 
surveillance’52 can hardly be overestimated, reminding us that the ‘progressive 
uses of the Internet’,53 including its general contribution to democracy, cannot be 
dissociated from its retrograde tendencies. 
Feenberg, in contrast to orthodox Marxist interpretations of the digital age, affirms 
that public engagement with pressing contemporary issues on the Internet is ‘not moti- 
vated by struggle over the distribution of surplus value as are workers’ struggles’.54 This 
is not to deny that Marx had a subtle understanding of technology, including its vital role 
in  mobilizing  industrial  workers  across  the  globe.  In the early twenty-first century, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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however, we have been witnessing the rise of an era in which, arguably, the quasi- 
ubiquity of technology is more evident than ever before in human history: 
 
Today technical mediation touches every aspect of society, not just the factory. The entire 
population of advanced capitalist societies is enrolled in many overlapping technical 
networks, each of which is organized by a hierarchical administration modelled on capi- 
talist management.55 
 
While recognizing the powerful role of technology in influencing societal develop- 
ments, Feenberg – wary of technological determinism and civilizational fatalism – 
stresses the importance of human agency in shaping the course of history. On his 
account, ‘[h]uman action, not technology, will decide the future of the Internet’.56 
Feenberg warns his readers not to overstate the case for the alleged novelty of the 
Internet, since some of its defining characteristics – such as multifunctionality and 
multiconnectedness – are not unprecedented. Indeed, ‘[a]ll technologies establish net- 
works in the sense that they bring people and things together’,57 and all technologies 
accomplish this ‘in combinations determined by a mix of symbolic and causal rela- 
tions’.58 Drawing on Ju¨rgen Habermas’s work, one may wonder what place the Internet 
occupies in ‘the system’ and ‘the lifeworld’.59 Largely controlled by both corporate and 
governmental forces, it constitutes an essential element of people’s (digitally mediated) 
experience of, and interaction with, reality. In this chapter, Feenberg offers an in-depth 
analysis of key sociological issues arising from the tension-laden constitution of the 
Internet, illustrating that its very existence hinges on both subjects and objects, symbolic 
and causal relations, normative and objective forces, experiential and systemic 
resources, communicative and instrumental powers, counterhegemonic and 
prohegemonic struggles. 
 
Part III 
Part III is entitled ‘Theory’.60 In this part, which contains three chapters, Feenberg aims 
to outline the relation of his own approach to the works produced by major scholars in his 
field of inquiry, permitting him to reformulate his instrumentalization theory.61 Ques- 
tioning the preponderance of instrumental reason in modern society, Feenberg notes that 
‘[p]hilosophers have long criticized a form of life based on the pursuit of ever more 
powerful means without regard for any higher purpose’.62 In the ‘disenchanted’ world of 
modernity, the concern with means appears to override the concern with ends – that is, 
formal   rationality   (Zweckrationalita¨ t)   seems   to   trump   value   rationality 
(Wertrationalita¨ t).  In  premodern  times,  the  search  for  ‘higher  purposes’  used  to  be 
justified by ‘worldviews based on myths effectively refuted by the Enlightenment’.63 
The rise of modernity is inextricably linked to the emancipation from ideological dog- 
mas that lack epistemic validity, social authority, and political legitimacy when assessed 
against rigorous standards of discursive rationality, critical inquiry, and scientific dis- 
covery. Yet, ‘the belief in progress that inspired the Enlightenment’64 cannot be dis- 
sociated from the repressive and retrograde tendencies that appear to be built into 
modernity. Instrumentalization theory seeks to unearth the ‘progressive possibilities’65 
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inherent in modernity without underestimating its regressive potential and without draw- 
ing ‘dystopian conclusions’.66 Part of this journey is to demonstrate that human ration- 
ality, in the sense of Vernunft, is an emancipatory capacity. Thus, ‘instead of showing the 
social dimension of rationality’,67 as in the previous chapters, the aim of these chapters is 
‘to show the rationality of the social’.68 Such an undertaking, which urges us to renew 
CT’s dialogical engagement with the social sciences, may provide us with solid grounds 
on which to make a case for ‘a revised idea of progress’.69 
Chapter 5 – entitled ‘Reason and Experience in the Age of the Technosystem’70 – 
considers different theories of modernity, notably the intellectual contributions made by 
prominent  members  of  the  Frankfurt  School,  but  also  those  by  Gyo¨rgy  Luka´cs  and 
Hannah Arendt. According to Feenberg, a striking feature that these scholars have in 
common is that they ‘all resist the reduction of the social world to functionality’.71 
Hence, they are all critical of the preponderance of instrumental rationality over eman- 
cipatory forms of rationality – such as communicative, discursive, substantive, and 
critical modes of rationality. For Feenberg, a central problem with contemporary (par- 
ticularly Habermasian and post-Habermasian) CT is not only that it tends to be reformist, 
rather than radical or revolutionary, but also that its understanding of the political (and, 
one may add, of the social, the cultural, and the economic) ‘excludes the technosys- 
tem’.72 Feenberg complains that, within these reductive accounts, ‘[s]ocial struggle over 
the technosystem is undertheorized, if not completely ignored’,73 since it is attributed, at 
best, a peripheral status within their conceptual architectures of society. Effectively, this 
leads to ‘a renewed version of the split between (political) values and (technical) facts’,74 
which is both theoretically misleading and practically counterproductive. 
 
Value and fact are rigorously distinguished only in theory. In everyday life they mix as in 
the good old days of Aristotle.75 
 
In sum: at the conceptual level, facts and values may be differentiated as ideal types; 
at the ontological level, they overlap. In the social world, all ‘facts’ are value-laden, 
since they are interpreted, and acted upon, in a contextually contingent and culturally 
variable fashion. At the same time, all ‘values’ are fact-laden, since they impact upon the 
ways in which humans engage in both the material and the symbolic construction of the 
objective, normative, and subjective dimensions pervading their existence. This ‘double 
hermeneutic’ regarding the relationship between facts and values is reflected in the 
‘double existence’ of functional objects, which are ‘both what they are and what they 
are for’76 – that is, they have both an objective and a purposive character. Functionality 
‘crosses the line between value and fact’.77 It bridges the alleged gap between the two, 
since the functions attributed to things have both physical and cultural components. 
Indeed, ‘[t]he double aspects – factual and normative – apply to the technical sphere   
as to every other aspect of life’.78 For they are integral to the human world, whose 
incessant construction depends on the combination  of what is  and what  ought to be. 
In the age of the technosystem, reason permits us to make sense of, and experience 
allows us to engage with, the technological mediation of the world. 
Chapter 6 – entitled ‘The Concept of Function in Critical Constructivism’79 – is 
arguably   the   intellectually   most   challenging   and  theoretically  richest  section  of 
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Feenberg’s book. It traces the philosophical background to his instrumentalization the- 
ory in the works of Heidegger and Luka´cs, demonstrating ‘its relevance to the concept of 
functionality in an analytic philosophy of technology’.80 In terms of breadth and depth, 
this chapter is both impressive and inspiring. Owing to its complexity, it is difficult to 
provide an accurate summary of its main arguments in one paragraph. The key purpose 
of this chapter is to explore ‘the nature and limits of functionality’.81 Undoubtedly, 
‘[f]unctions and functional objects have a place in social life’.82 Indeed, one may add 
that the whole point of sociological functionalism is to grasp the constitution of social 
phenomena, forces, and constellations in terms of their functions. Given the centrality of 
this task, functionalist approaches can be found in intellectual traditions as diverse as 
institutionalism, Marxism, feminism, and constructivism. The problem, however, is that 
‘modern societies treat everything as a function’,83 illustrating the preponderance of 
instrumental rationality (that is, ultimately, functionalist rationality84) in the context    
of modernity. Feenberg rightly poses the question of why it appears to be the case that 
functionality ‘gives rise to the crises and pathologies of modernity’.85 Part of the answer 
he gives to this question is what may be described as the universalization of functionality 
in modernity: 
 
Functional understanding has become a universal perspective, an a priori principle for the 
constitution of objects generally with disastrous consequences.86 
 
Functionality is so central to the human condition that even its compulsive celebra- 
tion may be normalized, if not naturalized, to such an extent that those immersed in, if 
not controlled by, it are more likely to reinforce than to undermine its ubiquitous 
dominance. Grappling with the multifaceted implications of this issue, Feenberg goes 
on to argue that an ‘implicit theory of function’87 informs the writings of Heidegger, 
Luka´cs, and Marcuse. 
Considering different theories of function,88 Feenberg starts from the assumption that 
‘[t]echnical objects have a foot in two worlds’89: on the one hand, in ‘a world of human 
intentions’,90 which is both subjective in that these are projected upon reality by 
meaning-generating actors and normative in that these are embedded in culturally vari- 
able horizons of interpretation; on the other hand, in ‘a world of objective properties’,91 
which is factual in that these are inherent in the ontological constitution of the entities in 
question. Arguably, the most convincing ‘analytic theories of technical function’92 are 
those that offer a balanced account of both sides of this relation. Furthermore, it is 
essential to grasp both the ‘everyday’ and the ‘scientific’ uses of the term ‘function’. 
This can be achieved by developing a ‘double hermeneutic’, capable of understanding 
the interaction of epistemic layers produced by both laypersons and experts.93 
As emphasized by Wybo Houkes and Pieter E. Vermaas in their ‘dual natures’ 
project,94 both sides of functionality need to be studied: its subjective side ‘consists in 
beliefs and purposes together constituting a user-plan’,95 which is derived from presup- 
positions about properties ‘based on direct experience or on information obtained from 
experts’96 (or a combination of these two epistemic levels); its objective side ‘consists in 
specific physical properties’,97 whose ontological significance can be comprehended by 
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laypersons  and/or  experts on the basis of  everyday experience  and/or  evidence-based 
research. 
Feenberg rejects (or at least claims to reject) ‘technological determinism’98 – that is, 
the supposition that both the constitution and the development of the social world are 
largely, if not entirely, determined by technological forces. In this respect, he proposes to 
distinguish between technique and technologies99: the former refers to ‘specific techni- 
cal elements [ . . .  ] which are in themselves neutral applications of objective knowledge 
of nature’100; the latter designate ‘developed ensembles of technical elements’101 and, as 
such, ‘are greater than the sums of their parts’.102 Technologies are defined by socially 
contingent ‘criteria of purpose’103 realized through ‘the very selection and arrangement 
of the intrinsically neutral units from which they are built up’.104 These criteria are 
‘embodied’ in the technology and, hence, irreducible to ‘an extrinsic use to which a 
neutral tool might be put’.105 In short, technologies are culturally codified, purposively 
signified, and functionally organized sets of techniques. Feenberg’s ‘critical constructi- 
vism’ is a plea for a ‘double-aspect theory of technology with the implied reference to 
double-aspect theories of the mind/body relation’.106 Such an approach discards both 
purely mechanical and merely contextual explanations of technology: the former lead to 
‘na¨ıve instrumentalism or technological determinism’,107 whereas the latter result in 
short-sighted perspectivism or technological relativism. The aim, then, is to demonstrate 
the extent to which, far from excluding one another, ‘[c]ausality and culture intersect in 
functionality’.108 
In this regard, Feenberg’s distinction between functionalism and CC is important:109 
 
The former, which is epitomized in analytic theories of function, stresses ‘cog- 
nitive aspects of the interaction between causality and culture’.110 On this 
account, the projective attribution of function to a particular object hinges on    
an actor’s assumption that ‘the materials possess natural properties suitable for 
use’.111 The preoccupation with physical qualities in the ascription of function is 
essential to the scientific discovery of ‘the naturalistically conceived objective 
properties of things’.112 
The latter, which is reflected in a phenomenology of functionality,113 explores 
‘social aspects of the phenomena’114 under consideration. This framework is 
action-theoretic – not only in that it takes ‘the beliefs and intentions of actors’115 
seriously, but also in that it examines ‘the subjective and objective conditions of 
functionalization as a social process’.116 Such a constructivist- 
phenomenological venture permits us to understand that not only the physical 
properties of objects but also the interpretations performed by subjects are 
integral to ‘the problems to which technical solutions are addressed’117 – by   
both laypersons and experts. If ‘user experiences’118 made by actors in their 
lifeworlds are crucial to both the development and the application of technol- 
ogy, then ‘function must be situated in relation to the culture and way of life it 
serves’.119 In short, a technical object is both ‘a sum of physical properties’120 
and an ensemble of normatively and subjectively variable presuppositions and 
intentions.   It  is  worth  remembering  that  CT,  long  before the rise of 
• 
• 
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constructivism,  urged  us  to  take  issue  with  crude  versions  of  positivism by 
recognizing that ‘facts are made, mediated by Subjectivity’.121 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, Feenberg provides a thorough overview of 
the philosophies of technology in the writings of Heidegger and Luka´cs, culminating in 
a passionate defence of his own approach: instrumentalization theory, which – as he 
notes – he has been developing in his previous works.122 In essence, it represents 
Feenberg’s systematic attempt ‘to account for functionality as a social phenom- 
enon’.123 More specifically, it aims to demonstrate that several aspects of what he  
terms ‘technique’ manifest themselves in ‘the structure of the technical subject and 
object’.124 Pursuing this endeavour, he insists on ‘the double aspects of technical 
functionality. There is no purely technical; the technical is always already cultural’.125 
Instrumentalization theory, then, draws on the following insights: 
 
1. ‘[C]ausal and cultural functionalizations complement each other’,126 making the 
allocation of specific functions in the design of artefacts and systems possible in 
the first place. 
2. Like other elements of social life, ‘design is never fixed once and for all’127 but 
adjustable and replaceable, illustrating the reconstructability and renormalizabil- 
ity of all spatiotemporally contingent facets of the human world. Actors can 
‘resignify the object in terms of new demands’128 and, in accordance with poten- 
tially changing circumstances, ascribe ‘new technical characteristics’129 to it. 
In other words, the analysis of functionalization processes ‘splits along two axes, 
causal and cultural aspects, and objective and subjective aspects’,130 which, while being 
conceptually separable, are ontologically interrelated. Traditional dichotomies – such as 
structure/agency, object/subject, material/symbolic, and macro/micro – collapse when 
recognizing the interdependence and interpenetration of structural and agential, objec- 
tive and subjective, material and symbolic, as well as macro- and micro-level forces in 
the creation, application, and circulation of technology.131 
For Feenberg, the technosystem contains three key components: (1) markets, (2) 
administrations, and (3) technologies.132 Each of these is sustained by a particular form 
of ‘social rationality’133: 
 
Markets exhibit mathematical equivalence, administrations relate rules to cases on the 
model of the relation of scientific law to particular facts, and technology seeks optimization 
and efficiency through measurement and calculation. The instrumentalization theory 
applies with some modifications to markets and administrations. In all three spheres, pos- 
sibilities of technical control are designed into objects or institutions in conformity with a 
combination of causal and cultural principles.134 
 
Markets involve processes of commodification, administrations require processes of 
bureaucratization, and technologies entail processes of control optimization. The central 
aim of Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory is to uncover the interdependence and 
interpenetration of these three components. The technosystem represents ‘a field of 
technical practices aimed at control of the environment, whether natural, economic, or 
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administrative’.135 It is crucial, however, not to isolate rationalities (irrespective of their 
typological specificity) from the social contexts in which they are embedded and 
employed.136 From Feenberg’s perspective, the environment can be regarded ‘as an 
ensemble of sociotechnically rational functions’137 – in short, as a functionally organized 
ecosystem constructed, and constantly reconstructed, by purposive, cooperative, and 
creative creatures capable of providing reasons for their actions. Functionality, far from 
being reducible to ‘a subjective idea’138 or ‘a material fact’139 (or indeed a combination 
of the two), constitutes ‘a social process’140 in and through which technical concerns are 
cross-fertilized with ‘cultural or political desiderata’141 and tested against objective 
‘constraints in the design of concrete artifacts or systems’.142 
The principal problem with the technosystem is that it ‘strives to be all-encompass- 
ing’,143 since it is oriented towards the ‘total functionalization’144 of society. This 
process has highly detrimental consequences, three of which are particularly noteworthy: 
 
1. the dehumanization, depersonalization, and instrumentalization of social 
relations; 
2. the systematic destruction of the environment on a global scale; and 
3. the technical manipulation of culturally specific meanings, contributing to the 
rise of nihilistic scepticism.145 
 
These serious consequences cannot be alleviated, let alone undone, by redefining or 
‘pushing back the boundaries of technical mediation’.146 ‘[U]niversal functionaliza- 
tion’147 is so essential to late-modern life that ‘a return to “nature” is inconceivable’.148 
In a world of total functionalization, ‘the richness and complexity of both lived experi- 
ence and the human subject’149 are undermined by processes of abstraction and aliena- 
tion. Crucially, for Feenberg, decisive ‘democratic interventions into the technical 
domain’150 are required to bring about a ‘gestalt switch’,151 capable of overcoming the 
pathologies of modernity by building a society in which the fulfilment of human needs, 
rather than the pursuit of instrumental imperatives, takes priority. 
Chapter 7 – entitled ‘The Logic of Protest’152 – examines ‘the rationality of public 
interventions into the technosystem’.153 It does so by affirming that the theory of judge- 
ment, derived from Arendt’s interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics, can serve as a 
tool to make sense of the tension-laden relationship between laypersons and experts. 
Such an undertaking obliges us to reflect on the nature of the public sphere. In this 
respect, Feenberg suggests that rhetorical analysis of public debate may provide a viable 
alternative to Habermas’s discourse ethics, including his ‘rationalistic theory of delib- 
erative democracy’.154 Similar to Habermas, other prominent critical theorists – such as 
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse – have articulated powerful critiques of instrumental 
rationality, while arguing for ‘the possibility of another form of rationality that would 
fulfill the dream of enlightenment without its destructive consequences’.155 
Feenberg explores the role of judgement in shaping societal developments.156 In his 
opinion, Kant’s distinction between ‘determinant’ (or ‘determinative’) and ‘reflective’ 
types of judgement may be useful in this respect. Moreover, Feenberg offers a pertinent 
account of Albena Azmanova’s theory of public debate, which – he maintains – can be 
applied  to  the  study of the politics  of the technosystem.  Particularly important in this 
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regard is her proposal to distinguish four levels in the normative structure of society: (1) 
institutional rules and procedures, (2) a multiplicity of values and interests, (3) principles 
of justice, and (4) a ‘phronetic’ coding with paradigms of articulation and significa- 
tion.157 Finally, Feenberg reflects on ‘the rhetoric of the technosystem’.158 Here, he 
builds on two key distinctions: first, Michel Foucault’s distinction between (informal, 
experience-based, and explicitly normative) ‘subjugated knowledges’ and (formal, 
abstract, and canonized) ‘scientific knowledge’; second, Michel de Certeau’s distinction 
between (official and institutional) ‘strategies’ and (unofficial and grassroots) ‘tactics’ 
employed by actors occupying subordinate positions within institutions. In this conflict 
between prohegemonic and counterhegemonic forces, instrumentalization theory aims to 
open up a space of imagination in which ‘[t]he struggle over the technosystem’159 lies at 
the core of the quest for human emancipation. 
The concluding chapter deals with ‘the question of progress’.160 Feenberg starts from the 
assumption that CT ‘has always been based on utopian hopes’.161 In his eyes, this – broadly 
optimistic – outlook presupposes a conception of history that is (at least potentially) ‘pro- 
gressive’.162 Given this (implicit or explicit) belief in ‘progress’, postmodern and postcolo- 
nial approaches pose a serious challenge to CT, insofar as its advocates seek to escape the 
charges of relativism and (Eurocentric) universalism.163 Feenberg urges his readers to con- 
ceive of progress ‘not as a tendency of history but as an achievement of struggle against 
injustice’.164 To qualify as truly progressive, however, the normative grounds underlying 
these struggles cannot be confined to the typical versions of Western principles and ideals but 
must be nourished by ‘the progressive desires of peoples everywhere’165 across the globe. 
Over the past decades, there has been a shift from the (somewhat ambitious) pursuit of 
‘grand narratives’ to the (comparatively modest) defence of ‘local narratives’.166 Just as 
postmodernists a`  la Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard reject the  idea of ‘progress’  as an illusion 
embedded in modernity’s Zeitgeist,167 critical theorists a` la Walter Benjamin have been 
warning for some time that ‘faith in progress has gilded the horrors of history in a false 
glory’.168 Amy Allen’s The End of Progress169 is a bold attempt to take postcolonial 
sensitivities seriously, notably the accusation that European intellectuals – among them, 
critical theorists – tend to ignore, if not to deny, ‘the entanglement of their normative 
ideals with the horrific facts of colonial domination and genocide’.170 Allen insists on 
exposing the intertwinement of modernity (including the Enlightenment) and imperial- 
ism (including colonialism). Faced with this challenge, she advocates a ‘metanormative 
contextualism’,171 which is based on two assumptions: 
 
1. ‘moral principles or normative ideals are always justified relative to a set of 
contextually salient values, conceptions of the good life, normative horizons – 
roughly speaking, forms of life or lifeworlds’172; 
2. ‘there  is  no  u¨ ber-context,  no  context-free  or  transcendent  point  of  view  from 
which we can adjudicate which contexts are ultimately correct’.173 
 
On this account, ‘progress’ is possible, but the very idea of ‘civilizational leaning’174 is 
to be rejected, insofar as it reinforces the myth of ‘the transcendent superiority of the 
West’.175 It appears, then, that CT needs to overcome both epistemic extremes – that is, 
universalism and particularism,  foundationalism and relativism,  transcendentalism and 
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contextualism – if it seeks to propose a credible ‘third position’.176 To Feenberg’s mind, 
however, it is vital to recognize that social, political, and moral forms of progress cannot 
be properly understood without considering the issue of scientific-technical progress.177 
In his assessment, ‘the clean separation of normative and technical rationality’178 is a 
highly questionable epistemological and methodological move that brings CT danger- 
ously close to the realm of mainstream – including conservative – political theory.179 
One of the dangers of such a short-sighted approach is that it fails to acknowledge that 
‘obstacles to progress are often not political in the usual sense but are embedded in the 
design of the technosystem’.180 Progress – far from being reducible to legal, judicial, 
political, or institutional changes, which are of primary concern in procedural theories 
of democracy181 – is ‘realized essentially through technosystem change’.182 If we fall 
into the positivist trap of portraying ‘the technical conditions of progress as external 
“facts”’,183 then we run the risk of obscuring the pivotal role that democratic struggles 
play in shaping – and, if required, transforming – ‘the technical base itself’.184 
A key problem inherent in the technosystem, of course, is that it promotes, and 
indeed depends upon, ‘the peculiar hegemony of technical reason in modern societ- 
ies’.185 Feenberg’s CC faces up to ‘the failure of technical reason to deliver the moral 
advance promised since the Enlightenment’,186 thereby discarding a na¨ıvely optimis- 
tic, and essentially evolutionist, account of modernity. Whereas normative progress is 
reversible, technical progress is irreversible. The crucial point in this respect, however, 
is this: ‘Progress is not technical or moral but technical and moral’.187 In other words, 
progress is driven by both Verstand and Vernunft (not to mention Urteilskraft). 
Given the intertwinement of technical and normative aspects of social development, it 
is crucial to abandon the ‘na¨ıve confidence in progress’188 present in positivist and 
evolutionist thought. For this to be achieved, we need to urge both laypersons and experts 
‘to appreciate instances of progress where they occur’.189 While the metanarratives of 
modernity have arguably undergone a major crisis of legitimacy, as illustrated in the 
‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences,190 local forms of progress – epitomized in the 
celebration of micronarratives – have had, and continue to have, a significant impact on 
the development of highly advanced societies in the early twenty-first century. The 
paradigm shift from grand (‘global’) narratives to small (‘local’) narratives may ‘free 
the imagination to explore alternatives to both the existing society and the failed revolu- 
tions of the past’.191 Rather than announcing ‘the end of progress’, however, we need to 
concede that we are only just witnessing its beginning.192 In a normative sense, then, it is 
imperative to remind ourselves that believing in some kind of progress is crucial to 
public interventions. From a genuinely forward-looking perspective, there is no point  
in fighting for change unless those endorsing it consider it progressive.193 
 
 
II. Weaknesses and limitations 
Let us reflect on the weaknesses and limitations of Feenberg’s Technosystem in the 
following sections. 
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Imbalance 
It is to Feenberg’s credit that he has sought to demonstrate the relevance of his theoretical 
framework to the empirical study of social reality. Despite this laudable intention, there 
is a noticeable imbalance between the theoretical and the empirical parts of his argument. 
In fact, Part II – which is entitled ‘Application’194 – is the only section of the book that 
has a genuinely substantive focus. This part consists of just one chapter. This means that, 
out of eight chapters (if we include the Introduction and the Conclusion), only one 
chapter has an empirical outlook. Unsympathetic critics may object that this one- 
chapter section seems ‘tagged on’, since the book is, for the most part, a theoretical 
treatise, rather than an empirical investigation. 
 
Editing 
The book could have been edited more carefully. For instance, the use of punctuation 
(especially commas and hyphens) is somewhat sloppy and inconsistent. This may be 
partly due to the fact that the manuscript is based on articles previously published in 
different outlets, such as academic journals and edited books, with different house styles. 
Yet, this shortcoming adds to the impression that the book, because it is essentially a 
collection of already published material, does not hang together in a way that would 
allow its author to tell a coherent story. 
 
A collection of essays? 
The book contains only two ‘new’ chapters (Chapters 5 and 7). As spelled out in the 
Preface, various chapters ‘have been published in earlier versions’.195 In fact, this applies 
to almost the entire manuscript – notably the Introduction and Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. 
In his Preface, Feenberg thanks several people for helping him ‘to write this book’.196 It 
may have been more accurate if Feenberg had expressed his gratitude to them for having 
helped him to write several articles, which he subsequently put together and converted 
into a book. In one of the three endorsements that appear on the book cover, Wiebe E. 
Bijker states that ‘Feenberg has written his magnum opus’. Without wanting to question 
Feenberg’s considerable intellectual achievements (of which there are plenty, both in 
this book and in other works), Bijker’s commendation seems to be an overstatement, 
given that a collection of previously published articles – which, after some revisions, are 
simply put together – hardly qualifies as a ‘masterpiece’. This is not a merely formal 
matter but a serious content-related issue, in the sense that one major weakness of the 
book is that it is not always clear how the various chapters are logically interconnected, 
let alone how they make an overarching argument. 
Granted, each ‘Part’ is introduced by means of a valuable overview of what lies 
ahead, and the chapters share a concern with what Feenberg describes as ‘the techno- 
system’. The chapters, however, are uneven in terms of their quality (with Chapter 6 
standing out as by far the strongest contribution). Moreover, as a reader, one gets the 
impression that they were written for different audiences and that, although each chapter 
makes interesting points, together they do not result in a compelling argument that is 
14 
 
 
based on a clear and coherent structure. Perhaps the most obvious example of this 
problem is the ‘Conclusion’.197 Feenberg states that it ‘sums up the argument of the 
book in relation to the question of progress as elaborated there and in the debates among 
critical theorists’.198 This chapter, however, is essentially a separate discussion of Amy 
Allen’s The End of Progress.199 Despite some thematic overlap with the previous chap- 
ters, it certainly does not ‘sum up the argument of the book’. Considering the above, it 
would have been useful if the book’s subtitle had included the words Philosophical 
Essays, indicating that, except for two chapters, this volume is a set of previously 
published papers. 
 
Questionable claims 
The quality of Feenberg’s argument suffers from several questionable claims. For the 
sake of brevity, let us consider only some of them. 
‘Truth is always subtly eccentric with respect to the real’.200 Admittedly, this 
quote is taken out of context. Even when read in the context of the surrounding 
text, however, it is far from clear what exactly Feenberg is trying to convey here. 
The trouble is that Feenberg’s book contains plenty of aphorisms of this sort, 
which may sound elegant and insightful, but which lack rigorous conceptual, let 
alone empirical, substantiation. 
‘For analytic purposes, Habermas and Honneth relate normativity to the first- 
person perspective of the participant and the empirical facts of power to the 
third-person perspective of the observer’.201 This is a bold claim, for which 
Feenberg fails to provide any textual evidence. This may not come as a surprise, 
given that it caricatures the intellectual positions taken by these two prominent 
scholars. For both Habermas and Honneth, the construction of normativity and 
factuality is inextricably linked to physical, cultural, and personal dimensions of 
human reality. These are expressed, and interpreted, through the confluence of 
first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives. Lifeworlds are sus- 
tained by communicative (Habermas) and recognitive (Honneth) processes, 
allowing for the emergence of spheres of action and interaction, which, in the 
human universe, are generated and experienced as realms of objectivity, norma- 
tivity, and subjectivity. Normativity and subjectivity are as much part of science 
as objectivity is part of people’s lifeworlds, and vice versa. The simplistic oppo- 
sition between ‘normativity’ (first-person perspective) and ‘empirical facts’ 
(third-person perspective) does not do justice to CT’s attempt to account for the 
multifaceted constitution of ‘reality’ as it is constructed and ‘the world’ as it is 
experienced. 
‘As a member of my society I respond to rules of proper behavior as norms, while 
as an observer I perceive the power relations through which the rules have 
achieved normative status’.202 One need not be a Boltanskian to recognize that 
power relations are perceived (and, indeed, understood, discussed, problematized, 
and challenged) not only by ‘outside’ observers (such as social scientists) but also 
by ‘inside’ ordinary actors immersed in everyday interactions. One need not be a 
• 
• 
• 
 15 
 
 
Bourdieusian to acknowledge that behavioural rules and conventions are 
responded to (and, indeed, understood, discussed, problematized, and challenged) 
not only by ‘inside’ ordinary actors (that is, members of society) but also by 
‘outside’ observers embedded in competing, and yet interpenetrating, social 
fields.203 Once again, the simplistic opposition between ‘the following of beha- 
vioural rules’ (participant) and ‘the critique of behavioural rules’ (observer) fails 
to explore the extent to which these two levels of existential immersion and 
epistemic apprehension feed into each other. 
In the opening paragraph of the book, Feenberg – drawing on Aristotle – affirms 
that ‘philosophy begins in wonder’.204 He goes on to contend that ‘familiarity is 
the enemy of reflection’,205 before spelling out that one of the main aims of his 
book is ‘to defamiliarize one commonplace phenomenon: the social function of 
rationality’.206 It is true that wonder, disruption, and crisis are precious sources of 
reflection. Familiarity, however, is not necessarily ‘the enemy of reflection’. One 
need not be a hermeneutic philosopher a` la Gadamer to accept that without 
familiarity and prejudice (Vorurteilsstruktur) there would be no reflection at 
all.207 Moreover, it is not clear why we should consider ‘the social function of 
rationality’ as a ‘commonplace phenomenon’. Quite the opposite is the case: 
‘continental’ scholars (including critical theorists) have long criticized ‘analytic’ 
and ‘transcendental’ philosophers for failing to acknowledge the social constitu- 
tion (including the social functions) of rationality, precisely because it is not a 
commonplace. These are only a few basic examples from the opening paragraph 
that illustrate a general weakness of the book: it makes too many sweeping 
statements and unsubstantiated, if not erroneous, assertions. There is nothing 
wrong with using aphorisms or making ‘big claims’ as long as their validity is 
properly argued and corroborated. 
 
Lack of originality 
A considerable weakness of this book is that it makes various points that, far from being 
particularly original, will appear self-evident to most readers. Let us consider three 
examples: 
‘We must learn to live with the ambiguity’.208 Feenberg’s remarks regarding the 
‘ambiguity’ or ‘ambivalence’ of the human condition are hardly original. Declara- 
tions of this sort have been made by numerous scholars from different angles in 
the humanities and social sciences.209 
‘Most social critics, including the pessimists among them, believe implicitly in 
the idea of progress’.210 Unsurprisingly, most readers will agree with this con- 
tention. More importantly, Feenberg needs to specify what kind of social critics he 
has in mind – presumably, left-wing and progressive, rather than right-wing and 
retrograde, ones. It would have been appropriate to explain why even those social 
critics who claim to be ‘progressive’ without endorsing a particular notion of 
‘progress’ (especially postcolonialists and poststructuralists) actually, in one way 
or another, do believe in progress. 
• 
• 
• 
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The emphasis on the centrality of human practices (‘you are  what you do’211) 
has been on the agenda of different (notably philosophical and sociological) 
forms of pragmatism for some time. The same applies to the critique of con- 
sumer capitalism (‘[t]oday, not only are you what you do but even more 
emphatically you are what you buy’212), which social scientists have been 
articulating for several decades. It is hard to see what Feenberg has added to 
these age-old debates when summarizing them in aphoristic statements, of  
which there are plenty in his study. 
 
 
‘Non-human’ versus ‘human’? 
Throughout the book, Feenberg appears to take the distinction between ‘the non-human’ 
and ‘the human’ for granted. A significant development in recent debates in the huma- 
nities and social sciences is widespread recognition of the fact that this distinction is 
increasingly blurred, both conceptually and empirically. Obvious examples include the 
environment, the body, cognition, culture, and – unsurprisingly – technology. These 
appear to indicate that classical dichotomies – such as ‘non-human’ versus ‘human’, 
‘nature’ versus ‘culture’, ‘objectivity’ versus ‘normativity’ – are more and more difficult 
to defend. Feenberg broadly shares the ‘modern’ view that, as humans, we are equipped 
with the species-constitutive ability to (re)construct the conditions of our existence, by 
drawing on our purposive, cooperative, and creative capacities. To be clear, Feenberg 
provides numerous astute reflections on the human condition, stressing the power exer- 
cised by the constraints of our sociobiological immanence: 
 
As humans we can only act on a system to which we ourselves belong. Any change we 
make in the system affects us, too. This is the practical significance of our corporeal and 
social being. We exist in a world of causal powers and meanings we do not fully control. 
Our body exposes us to the laws of nature. And we are born into a cultural world we 
largely take for granted. In short, we are finite beings. Our finitude shows up in the 
reciprocity of action and reaction.213 
 
Feenberg notes that ‘[o]ur body exposes us to the laws of nature’,214 but also to the 
contingencies of society, because ‘we are born into a cultural world’.215 Still, he rightly 
warns that ‘[t]he extraordinary power of human beings to modify their niche supports the 
illusion of independence from the natural world’.216 It would have been useful, however, 
if he had elaborated on why the distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘society’ is not only 
controversial, but also possibly obsolete, if not misleading. 
Furthermore, one may wonder how broad (or narrow) the definition of ‘a system to 
which we ourselves belong’217 should be. Owing to technology, we are able to act on the 
moon. While it is part of our universe, it would be hard to argue that we belong to the 
moon, let alone that we should consider it as a serious candidate for human habitation. 
The same applies to various additional elements of our solar system – notably other 
planets. In short, Feenberg needs to revise bold assertions such as ‘[a]s humans we can 
only act on a system to which we ourselves belong’.218 One can find several examples 
that suggest otherwise. 
• 
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Technology and experience 
Feenberg’s analysis of the relationship between technology and society is based on a 
somewhat narrow conception of experience. He associates experience with the lifeworld, 
rather than with science. This is reductive, however, given that experience constitutes an 
integral part of the scientific endeavour, notably of its empirical variants. Thus, 
‘technical knowledge and experience’219 are not only ‘complementary’220 but also co- 
constitutive. The former is not simply ‘incomplete’221 but, more fundamentally, incon- 
ceivable ‘without input from’222 the latter. We may add that, within the philosophy of 
science, experience serves as a foundational category in two diametrically opposed 
conceptions of social research: for positivists and realists, experience is a crucial source 
of objective knowledge; for constructivists and interpretivists, experience is a vital 
source of normative and/or subjective knowledge. For all of them, however, experience 
is a – if not, the – key source of knowledge, not only (as emphasized by Feenberg) in the 
lifeworld but also (as largely ignored by Feenberg) in science. 
Hence, the opposition between science (as ‘an absolute spectator on existence’223) 
and everyday experience (involving ‘active persons in the contingent movement of 
events and ideas’224) is problematic, unless we recognize that the former and the latter 
are co-constitutive. Just as science relies on experience as a major point of reference in 
the search for epistemic validity, experience is permeated by science in both the 
material and the symbolic construction of social reality. Consider, however, Feen- 
berg’s following passage: 
 
The nature discovered by science seems indifferent to humanity, while the nature we 
experience is saturated with anthropomorphic qualities. We moderns believe in science. 
By contrast we think our ordinary understandings of nature are subjective.225 
 
This statement (similar to several other sets of assertions in Feenberg’s book) is flawed for 
a number of reasons. (1) Given that ‘nature’ has been profoundly influenced and shaped 
(and, on many levels, both dominated and exploited) by ‘humanity’, the former and the 
latter are deeply intertwined, not least since the emergence of the Anthropocene. (2) Not all 
‘moderns believe in science’ – or there is at least a large spectrum of opinions on the role 
and power of science, ranging from highly optimistic to highly pessimistic accounts of 
what it can achieve. (3) Most modern epistemologists would agree that ‘our ordinary 
understandings of nature’ are not only subjective but also objective and normative – that 
is, our everyday ways of making sense of the world are shaped by varying degrees of 
objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity, since human survival is inconceivable without 
the socio-epistemic confluence of realism, tribalism, and perspectivism. 
Feenberg is right to insist that ‘[s]cience is supposed to inform and guide experi- 
ence’,226 but he fails to stress that the latter is also supposed to inform and guide the 
former (in fact, he denies this when adding ‘not the other way around’). In short, his 
phenomenological (that is, lifeworld-focused) conception of experience is deeply pro- 
blematic in that it overlooks the fact that the whole point of science (notably its empirical 
and empiricist versions) is to rely on experience – not only as its epistemic starting point, 
but also as its principal source of inquiry and discovery. 
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Science criticizes and transcends lived experience. It separates itself from our experience 
through rigorous critique. [ ..  . ] The scientific idea of nature involves a systematic negation 
of experience; appearance and reality stand opposed.227 
 
To conceptualize ‘science’ and ‘experience’ (by the way, there is no such thing as a 
‘non-lived experience’) in terms of a categorical opposition of this sort is misleading. In 
a society that is profoundly shaped by advanced forms of technology, the boundaries 
between ‘science’ and ‘experience’ are increasingly blurred. Feenberg, therefore, is right 
to insist that ‘[i]t is no longer possible to decide in principle between our two relations to 
nature’228 – that is, an ordinary and a scientific one. He could have gone a step further, 
however, by conceding that it has never been possible to decide between these two 
relations – that is, ever since scientific knowledge has shaped ‘our entire material 
existence through its technological applications’.229 
‘Science and technology influence our understanding of our experience, but the 
reverse is also true’.230 If our interpretation of the relationship between science and 
experience is ‘dialectical rather than hierarchical’,231 then neither everyday experience 
nor science will have ‘the last word’.232 We, as members of the human species, are not 
able to choose between ‘science’ and ‘experience’, since both of them – as ‘two onto- 
logical principles’233 and cornerstones of technologically advanced life forms – ‘operate 
in our civilization and culture’.234 The point, therefore, is to conceive of the relationship 
between science and experience not as a ‘persistent dualism’,235 but, rather, as a histor- 
ical constellation of interdependence and interpenetration. 
 
Technology and protest 
Feenberg makes several pertinent observations on the role of collective protests in 
bringing about social change. A problematic aspect of his analysis, however, is that    
he tends to assume that most – if not all – protests are ultimately about technology.    
He contends that ‘values are the facts of the future’.236 Given their ontological inter- 
twinement, ‘[v]alues are not the opposite of fact’.237 In the social world, the former and 
the latter permeate, if not presuppose, one another. While it is true that the world in 
which we live has been, and continues to be, shaped by values, it is reductive to affirm 
that ‘[t]echnologies are the crystallized expression of those values’.238 Technologies are 
partly (and, in many cases, profoundly) influenced by values, but their development is 
also contingent on facts – that is, not only on normative arrangements and subjective 
perceptions, but also on objective constellations. 
Feenberg’s ‘technologistic’ conception of political contestation leads him to suggest 
that ‘[p]rotests formulated in the language of values express aspects of reality that have 
not yet been incorporated into the technical environment’.239 Contrary to this assertion, 
however, social protests may express aspects of reality that have already been incorpo- 
rated into the technical environment – not to mention the fact that there are numerous 
forms of political contestation in which the technical environment plays at best a sec- 
ondary (if any serious) role. The confluence of the normative force of the factual and the 
factual force of the normative is vital to the construction of human realities. This insight 
does not permit us, however, to conclude that technological issues lie at the core of all 
 19 
 
 
social and political struggles. All conflicts over values, articulated in protests of different 
forms, are permeated by technology. This does not mean that the former are always 
primarily concerned with, let alone driven by, the latter. 
 
Technological determinism 
A major irony of Feenberg’s book is the following contradiction: on several occasions, 
he criticizes, and distances himself from, technological determinism; key parts of his 
argument suggest, however, that he himself flirts with, if not subscribes to, technological 
determinism. He rightly maintains, and convincingly demonstrates, that ‘society and 
technology are inextricably imbricated’.240 This insight justifies the underlying assump- 
tion that there is no comprehensive study of society without a critical sociology of 
technology. Yet, to contend that ‘[s]ocial groups exist through the technologies that bind 
their members together’241 is misleading. For not all social groups are primarily defined 
by the technologies that enable their members to relate to, and to bond with, one another. 
Indeed, not all social relations, or social bonds, are based on, let alone determined by, 
technology. 
Of course, Feenberg is right to argue that ‘technologically mediated groups influence 
technical design through their choices and protests’.242 Ultimately, though, the previous 
assertion is tautological. This becomes clear if, in the above sentence, we replace the 
word ‘technological(ly)’ with terms such as ‘cultural(ly)’, ‘linguistical(ly)’, ‘politi- 
cal(ly)’, ‘economic(ally)’, or indeed another sociological qualifier commonly used to 
characterize the specificity of a social relation. Hence, we may declare that ‘culturally, 
linguistically, politically, and economically mediated groups influence cultural, lin- 
guistic, political, and economic conventions through their choices and protests’. In 
saying so, we are stating the obvious. If, however, we aim to make a case for cultural, 
linguistic, political, or economic determinism, then this is problematic to the extent  
that we end up reducing the constitution of social arrangements to the product of one 
overriding causal set of forces (whether these be cultural, linguistic, political, eco- 
nomic, technological, or otherwise). 
While declaring that he is a critic of technological determinism, Feenberg – in central 
passages of his book – gives the impression that he is one of its fiercest advocates. 
Feenberg’s techno-Marxist evolutionism is based on the premise that ‘progress is rea- 
lized essentially through technosystem change’243 – that is, on the assumption that, 
effectively, human progress is reducible to technological development. Feenberg is right 
to stress that ‘[t]echnical progress is joined indissolubly to the democratic enlargement 
of access to its benefits and protection from its harms’.244 ‘Concretization’,245 under- 
stood in this way, conceives of progress as a ‘local, context-bound phenomenon uniting 
technical and normative dimensions’.246 We may add, however, that progress has not 
only technical (or technological) but also economic, cultural, and political dimensions, 
which contain objective, normative, and subjective facets. At times, the differentiation 
between these aspects is blurred, if not lost, in Feenberg’s account, given his tendency to 
overstate the power of technology at the expense of other crucial social forces. In other 
words, progress is not only ‘inextricably entangled with the technosystem’,247 but it is 
also indissolubly entwined with the economic, cultural, and political systems in which it 
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unfolds  and  for (or against)  which  it  exerts its  objective,  normative,  and  subjective 
power. 
The preceding reflection takes us back to the problem of techno-reductionism: 
 
The struggle over the technosystem began with the labor movement. Workers’ demands for 
health and safety on the job were public interventions into production technology.248 
 
All struggles over social (sub)systems have not only a technological but also various 
other (notably economic, cultural, and political) dimensions. Demands made by partic- 
ular subjects (defined by class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability – or a combination of 
these sociological variables) are commonly expressed in public interventions not only 
into production technology, but also into economic, cultural, and political systems. In all 
social struggles (including class struggle), technology can be an important means to an 
end, but it is rarely an end in itself. Put differently, social struggles are partly – but 
seldom essentially, let alone exclusively – about technology. 
 
Techno-socialism 
Feenberg seems to harbour the hope of building a future in which socialism prevails – 
and, with it, a ‘socialist technology’,249 which serves the goal of human fulfilment, 
empowerment, and emancipation. ‘The dream of socialist technology designed and 
controlled by those who build and use it has never been fully realized’.250 On this 
account, the project of constructing a socialist society is inextricably linked to the 
challenge of ‘broadening democracy to include the whole social terrain covered by the 
technosystem’.251 While Feenberg is right to underscore the extent to which ideological 
(‘socialism’), political (‘democracy’), demographic (‘social terrain’), technological 
(‘technosystem’), as well as – by implication – economic (‘productive forces’) and 
administrative (‘the state’) facets of social reality are intimately interrelated, his belief 
in ‘the dream of socialist technology’ seems, at best, na¨ıve and idealistic or, at worst, 
cynical and ahistorical. 
One need not be a right-wing libertarian to acknowledge that the multiple experiences 
with ‘the dream of socialist technology’ in the twentieth century have been largely 
disappointing and, in some cases, a major catastrophe. During the Cold War, marked  
by the ‘systemic competition’ (Systemkonkurrenz) between capitalism and socialism, the 
former greatly outperformed the latter in almost every aspect of advanced technologies. 
Feenberg’s romanticization of ‘socialist technology’ is at odds with the historical lessons 
that humanity was taught in the twentieth century. 
This is not to suggest that, under capitalism, technology is free of the major contra- 
dictions and pathological aspects that Feenberg describes and examines in his book (and, 
indeed, in many other of his works). Still, the romanticization of ‘socialist technology’ is 
no less problematic than the idealization of ‘capitalist technology’. We need to recognize 
that, in addition to the fact that the latter largely outperformed the former, many – albeit 
not all – of the civilizational challenges posed by contemporary technologies have 
emerged, and will continue to emerge, regardless of whether these are embedded in 
capitalist or socialist systems. 
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Both industrial and postindustrial formations have faced (and continue to face) 
serious social and environmental issues that are inextricably linked to technological 
developments (and captured in debates on alienation, reification, exploitation, and 
domination). As critical sociologists, we need to distinguish between those challenges, 
contradictions, and pathologies that are widespread in (if not unique or intrinsic to) 
capitalist societies and those that are widespread in (if not unique or intrinsic to) 
socialist societies. Granted, to provide an accurate and fine-grained picture, such an 
ambitious explanatory endeavour would have to differentiate between ‘varieties of 
capitalism’252 and ‘varieties of socialism’.253 Systemic idiosyncrasies  notwithstand- 
ing, most likely there are significant commonalties and differences between capitalist 
and socialist technosystems, the empowering and disempowering aspects of which 
should be neither overstated nor understated. For Feenberg, the concept of ‘capitalist 
technosystem’ is a pleonasm, whereas the concept of ‘socialist technosystem’ is an 
oxymoron. Under both capitalism and socialism, however, technology has been shaped 
by the systemic forces of the economy and the state, including their instrumental 
imperatives and functionalist rationality. Arguably, both ‘the dream of capitalist tech- 
nology’ and ‘the dream of socialist technology’, for all their considerable accomplish- 
ments, have included episodes of real nightmares. 
Of course, Feenberg may assert that the world has not yet experienced ‘real’ social- 
ism. On this interpretation, the ‘actually existing socialism’ of the twentieth century was 
a state-controlled system, devoid of genuine democratic structures and processes. 
 
Democracy is a recognition of finitude. Citizens give up the claim to know and control 
everything. They accept the limits of their knowledge in submitting to a process of 
discussion.254 
 
Arguably, it was precisely this lack of democracy that significantly contributed to the 
collapse of ‘actually existing socialism’ in general and to the lagging-behind of socialist 
technologies in particular. The ‘problem of technological hubris’,255 to be tackled effec- 
tively, needs more, rather than less, democracy. 
 
Romanticizing the premodern 
Feenberg’s analysis of technology is based on a latent romanticization of premodern life 
forms. This tendency is synthesized in the contention that, ‘[u]ntil the emergence of total 
functionalization in late modernity, non-functional relations prevailed in most domains of 
social life’.256 This assumption is problematic on several counts. (1) How can one prove 
that ‘total functionalization’ did not prevail in premodern life forms? (2) One can make the 
case that ‘total functionalization’ has always prevailed – and will always prevail – in 
human societies, because functionality is an anthropological invariant and, as such, an 
integral part of our species-distinctive condition. (3) The romanticization of premodern life 
forms, along with the demonization of their modern counterparts, may be interpreted as a 
hidden version of conservatism a` la Heidegger, which lies at the heart of Feenberg’s 
critique of technology under capitalism. Admittedly, Feenberg – unlike Heidegger – is 
not only fascinated by technology but also keen to draw attention to its empowering 
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aspects. At the same time, his analysis suffers from a tendency to portray ‘total functio- 
nalization’ as a specifically modern, rather than an anthropological, problem. 
 
Nature versus society? 
Throughout the book, Feenberg grapples with the notion that technology permits the 
human species to ‘conquer’ nature. As he stresses, this ambition is paradoxical in the 
following sense: since ‘human beings are natural beings’,257 ‘the project of conquest is 
self-contradictory’.258 By dominating, exploiting, and destroying nature, human beings 
effectively contribute to, if not orchestrate, their own domination, exploitation, and 
destruction. More specifically, this paradox has two implications: 
As humanity seeks to conquer nature, it does so by equipping some sectors of the 
population with more powerful means to engage in domination, exploitation, and 
destruction than others. The domination of nature goes hand in hand with social 
domination (which may be based on key sociological variables such as class, 
ethnicity, gender, age, ability, etc. – or, indeed, on the intersectionally constituted 
combination of these variables). 
As humanity harms its natural environment, its eco-conquering actions ‘come 
back to haunt the perpetrators in the form of feedback from the system to which 
both conqueror and conquered belong’.259 Ultimately, the assault on nature is an 
assault on humanity. For the latter is firmly embedded in, and forms an integral 
part of, the former. To recognize, then, that ‘the things we do to nature we also do 
to ourselves’260 requires acknowledging that, far from being placed outside the 
ecosystem, we are situated within, and dependent upon, it. 
A central aspect that is missing from Feenberg’s account of this tension-laden con- 
stellation, however, is the following: by virtue of our species-constitutive capacities, we 
rise above nature, even if – paradoxically – we remain part of it. Admittedly, there is no 
consensus on the once-and-for-all identification of our main species-constitutive capa- 
cities or distinctively human features. In this respect, typical candidates are ‘reason’ 
(notably the cognitive trinity of Verstand, Vernunft, and Urteilskraft261), ‘conscious- 
ness’, ‘self-awareness’, ‘language’, ‘culture’, and ‘morality’ – to mention only a few. 
Yet, we need to put our finger on the attributes that make us distinctively ‘human’ and 
raise us above nature – even if only metaphorically, given that we are natural beings. 
Another important issue that needs to be addressed in this context is the concept of 
interest. What interests do human actors pursue? The following types of interest appear 
to be crucial: 
1. personal interests (‘the individual’); 
2. communitarian interests (‘the group’); 
3. institutional interests (‘the organization’); 
4. societal interests (‘the imagined community’); 
5. species-constitutive interests (‘humanity’); 
6. planetary interests (‘the world’); and 
7. universal interests (‘the universe’). 
• 
• 
 23 
 
 
Since all human actions are interest-laden and some human actions are also interest- 
driven, it is hard to see how it is possible to develop a CT of society without proposing a 
CT of interests. 
 
 
Fallibilism and science 
Consider the following statement: 
 
Modern scientific knowledge claims to be universal, and, indeed, it can be substituted for 
traditional knowledge everywhere, the success of technology confirming its validity. But 
scientists are all fallibilists; they do not believe in absolute truth. Understood epistemolo- 
gically, scientific method organizes the discovery of ‘truths’, or at least what scientists use 
for truths while they last.262 
 
The above passage is symptomatic of several issues arising from Feenberg’s concep- 
tion of science: 
Not all modern scientific knowledge purports to be ‘universal’ (let alone ‘uni- 
versalist’). The whole point of scientific research is to test (and thereby to confirm 
or to repudiate) the validity of truth claims. Different subject matters and different 
academic disciplines may allow for different degrees of certainty regarding the 
defensibility of claims to epistemic validity. Both in the natural sciences and in 
the social sciences, however, the positivist pursuit of value-free universality has 
been called into question for centuries, not least by critical theorists. 
It is misleading to suggest that modern scientific knowledge ‘can be substituted 
for traditional knowledge everywhere’.263 Of course, Feenberg is right to insist 
that the achievements of technology confirm its profound impact on nature and 
society. Contrary to Feenberg’s techno-optimism, however, they do not necessa- 
rily ‘confirm its validity’.264 More importantly, numerous forms of ‘traditional 
knowledge’ – including, for example, religious belief systems – cannot be 
replaced by ‘scientific knowledge’. The point is not to deny that, on various 
levels, the latter may be epistemically superior to the former. Rather, the point   
is to recognize that ‘traditional’ ways of relating to, engaging with, and attributing 
meaning to the world are essential to human society, including scientifically 
advanced and largely secularized life forms. 
Not all scientists are fallibilists. Some of them – however na ı¨ve and objectionable 
this may seem – believe in the possibility of discovering absolute truths and, thus, 
in the need to raise universal (that is, unconditional and non-relativizable) truth 
claims. Feenberg contradicts himself at this point: on the one hand, he asserts that 
‘[m]odern scientific knowledge claims to be universal’265; on the other hand, he 
affirms that ‘scientists are all fallibilists’.266 We cannot have it both ways. The 
age-old controversies between diametrically opposed epistemological positions – 
reflected in antinomies such as positivism versus interpretivism, realism versus 
constructivism, universalism versus particularism, foundationalism versus relati- 
vism, transcendentalism versus contextualism – will not go away. The merits and 
• 
• 
• 
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limitations of these debates notwithstanding, it would be erroneous to assume that 
the gap between diametrically opposed epistemological perspectives can be over- 
come by cross-fertilizing them, let alone by suggesting that they are all correct, 
even if they fundamentally contradict each other. 
 
 
Validity and legitimacy 
Feenberg rightly points out that ‘not all norms depend on power’267 and that, in fact, 
‘some respond to a rational advance in reflexivity and autonomy’.268 More specifically, 
he makes the evolutionist claim – which may have been inspired by Habermas’s early 
work269 – that ‘[a]t the collective level the learning process that disentangles reason from 
power is a universally valid progressive advance’.270 Referring to Allen’s disagreement 
with critical theorists such as Habermas,271 Honneth,272 and Forst,273 Feenberg discusses 
the (Foucauldian) view that ‘reason and power cannot be separated’274 and that, cru- 
cially, ‘reason is simply a supplement of power that power gives itself’.275 He eloquently 
summarizes this interpretation as follows: 
 
Subjects become the subjects they are through the practices determined by the power 
relations in which they participate. [ . . .  ] [R]eflexivity and autonomy depend to some extent 
on power rather than transcending it.276 
 
Although, broadly speaking, Feenberg offers a balanced critique of Allen’s position on this 
matter, he could have provided a more fine-grained account of the relationship between 
reason and power in terms of validity and legitimacy.277 The justifiability of an action, or a 
set of actions, depends not only on what is being done, but also on who does it, when, 
where, and to whom. ‘For objectivity (“What?”) is – inevitably – a matter of social 
authority (“Who?”), spatiotemporal contextuality (“Where and when?”), and interactional 
relationality (“To whom?”)’.278 Social arrangements, therefore, are not only the product of 
rational considerations, based on reason-giving practices oriented towards providing 
defensible justifications, but also the result of relational constellations, generated by 
interest- and power-laden practices motivated by dynamics of competition and positioning. 
Contrary to Feenberg’s assertion that ‘[t]he technosystem is the sum of [ .. . ] rational 
arrangements’,279 it is the ensemble of socio-historical constellations, which are shaped 
both by reason-giving practices testing different levels of validity and by power-laden 
practices establishing spatiotemporally variable codes of legitimacy. 
 
 
Progress and Eurocentrism 
Feenberg provides several astute reflections on the link between Eurocentrism and 
technology. The detrimental consequences of the former cannot be dissociated from  
the global impact of the latter. ‘The whole world has accepted Europe’s scientific- 
technical superiority in the last two centuries’.280 Feenberg insists that technology, 
along with the notion of progress (with which it is rightly or wrongly associated), is ‘far 
more  pervasive  and  influential  now  than  older  forms  of  sovereignty’.281   To put it 
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bluntly, technology speaks louder than words. This does not mean, however, that he is 
willing to equate technical progress with normative progress: 
 
The West, as the originator of modernity, can claim to be more ‘advanced’ in some respects 
than nations that have only begun to emulate it recently. But that is no reason for arrogant 
self-congratulation given the many serious problems confronting Western modernity. A 
non-Western nation that sought original solutions to these problems would have lessons to 
teach the West.282 
 
Building on Feenberg’s argument, it may be useful to distinguish between ontological 
Eurocentrism and epistemic Eurocentrism: the former designates a social reality, 
whereas the latter refers to an ideological perspective. Both forms of Eurocentrism are 
deeply problematic, but Feenberg urges us to concede that there is no point in denying 
their existence. An ‘effective critique of Eurocentrism’283 must account for the global 
spread of technology as a means to consolidating hegemonic – notably ‘Western’ – 
modes of power across the world. 
The above statement is problematic, however, in the following respects: (1) Strictly 
speaking, it may be misleading to portray ‘the West’ as ‘the originator of modernity’,284 
since ‘the West’ is the product of both endogenous and exogenous sources of influence. 
Historically, it has been shaped by both ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ forces. (2) Its 
genealogy notwithstanding, ‘the West’, far from representing a homogenous entity, is 
internally fragmented. (3) If we characterize ‘the West’ as ‘more “advanced”’,285 we risk 
falling into the trap of social evolutionism, whose advocates – in the context of (neo)- 
colonialism and (neo)imperialism – employ the language of ‘progress’ to defend assump- 
tions regarding ‘civilizational superiority’. 
Feenberg draws attention to the fact that ‘Eurocentrism intrudes on the lifeworld of non- 
European societies primarily through capitalism and technology’.286 He concedes, however, 
that not only economic and technological but also political and ideological forces have 
played a major role in ‘transforming life throughout the world’,287 in many cases without 
much – if any – respect for the needs, demands, and rights of those at the receiving end. 
‘Western’ ideals – including democracy – are still being ‘metabolized’288 by non-European 
actors. These ideals have been, and continue to be, mobilized to legitimize different versions 
of capitalist development. As such, they effectively serve as instruments for the imposition 
of imperial power. It is far from clear, however, to what extent the history of these ideals can 
(or cannot) be dissociated from their normative (and potentially emancipatory) value. 
Feenberg convincingly argues that there is no ‘progressive’ politics without a belief in 
‘progress’. Challenging both postcolonial and postmodern approaches, he is right to 
suggest that there is no point in throwing the baby out with the bathwater. In other 
words, despite its legitimizing role in colonialist and imperialist projects, the concept  
of ‘progress’ is an indispensable normative tool for distinguishing between progressive 
and retrograde political agendas. What is missing from Feenberg’s account is a systema- 
tic outline of the normative criteria that permit us to differentiate between ‘progressive’ 
and ‘non-progressive’ (including pseudo-progressive) conceptions and forms of 
progress. 
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Reform versus revolution? 
A key issue with which Feenberg grapples throughout the book is what may be 
described as capitalism’s integrationist power – that is, its  systemic  capacity  to  
adjust to behavioural, ideological, and institutional demands, allowing it to reinforce  
its own legitimacy. Given its systemic elasticity, adaptability, and absorbability,289 
capitalism has a remarkable capacity to overcome its internal crises and, crucially,       
to adjust to changing historical circumstances. Broadly speaking, Feenberg is right      
to suggest that, insofar as they have any transformative impact, social and political 
struggles tend to lead to reforms, rather than  revolutions.290  This  illustrates  that  
social  systems, including those based on simple or complex forms of domination,     
are ‘able to adjust to new constraints’.291 A central issue that Feenberg could, or 
perhaps should, have explored in more detail, however, is why it appears  to be  the 
case that capitalism is not only largely successful at adapting to altering social 
conditions but also fairly efficient at incorporating demands for social and political  
change, albeit in a reformist fashion. 
Consider key sociological variables (such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability) 
as well as their corresponding systems of discrimination and domination (such as clas- 
sism, racism, sexism, ageism, and ableism). Capitalism has proved capable of accom- 
modating reformist, if not radical, demands related to these areas of struggle – not least 
by commodifying them and thereby converting them into sources of profit under the ‘do- 
well-by-doing-good’ umbrella of (pseudo-) ‘progressive’ philanthrocapitalism. Neo- 
Marxists and post-Marxists will find it difficult to hold on to the orthodox Marxist 
distinction between the ‘main contradiction’ (Hauptwiderspruch) and ‘subordinate con- 
tradictions’ (Nebenwiderspru¨ che), according to which the latter (e.g. classism, racism, 
sexism, ageism, and ableism) represent epiphenomenalist expressions of the former 
(capitalism).292 The advantages and disadvantages of this conceptual architecture not- 
withstanding, a key question that remains is why capitalism has been, and continues to 
be, relatively successful in coping with the challenges posed by several coexisting (that 
is, interdependent, and yet relatively independent) systems of domination within the 
boundaries of its mode of production. 
 
 
Straw-man arguments 
On several occasions, it appears that Feenberg creates a straw man to make his argument 
work. For instance, he points out that advocates of CT and ANT tend to agree that 
‘individuality cannot be conceived independently of other people and things’,293 recog- 
nizing that human actors are always embedded in different social networks and histori- 
cally specific configurations. It is hard to think of any classical or contemporary social 
scientist, let alone sociologist, who would seriously deny this. In fact, a vital objective of 
social science is to account for the degree to which the seemingly most autonomous 
forms of individuality cannot be dissociated from structures and practices of sociality. 
The same applies to the corresponding assumption that the human subject should be 
conceived of ‘not as a spiritual entity, a substantialized thought, a cogito, but as a living 
being, hence a being essentially connected to its surroundings’.294 Again, this is hardly 
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news to anyone, since one of the main aims of social-scientific research is to scrutinize 
the multiple ways in which actors are shaped by their environment. 
In a similar vein, Feenberg reminds his readers of CT’s insistence that ‘the rational 
system of domination of advanced industrial society’295 can be regarded ‘as a contingent 
social achievement, rather than as an essential consequence of rationality as such’.296 
Who would seriously question the socio-historical constitution permeating any system of 
domination? The same applies to Feenberg’s contention that rationality, similar to other 
key components of human culture, ‘is not universal but [ . . .  ] context-bound’.297 Again, 
even ‘quasi-transcendental’ approaches, such as Habermas’s ‘universal pragmatics’,298 
highlight the extent to which all species-constitutive features of humanity – such as 
language, communicative reason, and consciousness – are embedded in historical con- 
texts and derived from people’s lifeworlds. Unsympathetic critics may rightly object that 
Feenberg is, once again, stating the obvious when affirming that ‘function must be 
situated in relation to the culture and way of life it serves’.299 Unfortunately, one finds 
an abundant amount of statements of this sort in Feenberg’s book. In the twenty-first 
century, we should dare to replace ‘the sociology of the obvious’ with ‘the sociology of 
the not so obvious’. 
 
 
Function(alism) 
Feenberg provides an intellectually rigorous and thought-provoking overview of the 
concept of function in CC.300 His astute and insightful reflections on the concept of 
function are one of the strongest aspects of his book. It is striking, however, that he does 
not touch upon, let alone examine or discuss, sociological versions of functionalism – for 
instance, functionalism a` la E´ mile Durkheim, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons, Robert 
Merton, or Niklas Luhmann. Granted, Feenberg’s approach is primarily philosophical, 
rather than sociological. Still, given his emphasis on the socio-historical constitution of 
function (notably in the realm of technology), it is surprising that sociological versions of 
functionalism are largely ignored in his – otherwise comprehensive and, in many ways, 
impressive – account of function. 
In this context, it is worth having a closer look at some of Feenberg’s assertions 
regarding ‘function’ and ‘the critical study of function’. With and beyond Feenberg, 
one may argue that ‘modern societies treat everything as a function’301 no more or less 
than premodern, or indeed postmodern, societies – precisely because function constitutes 
a core ingredient of the human condition. 
Thus, we may have to qualify Feenberg’s claim that ‘[f]unctional understanding has 
become a universal perspective’302: 
 
At the experiential level of everyday existence, this may be true insofar as the role 
of functions is crucial to the constitution and evolution of the human species, 
irrespective of the spatiotemporal specificities of different life forms. 
At the epistemic level of scientific inquiry, this may be true insofar as the expla- 
nation of functions is integral to the study of both the natural world and the social 
world.  Causality  and  functionality  are  intimately  intertwined.   It is hard to 
• 
• 
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dissociate the question of why something happens, develops, or works in a par- 
ticular way from the question of for what purpose it does so. 
Functionalists – notably in academic disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, 
criminology, and political science – insist on the aforementioned link between causality 
and functionality. Scholars opposed to functionalism, by contrast, regard it as ultimately 
conservative, if not reactionary, due to its alleged emphasis on ‘reproduction’ and 
‘structural determinacy’, along with its arguably reductive tendency to draw analogies 
between the natural world and the social world when examining striking similarities in 
terms of their respective functional organization. For critics of functionalism, a func- 
tional – let alone functionalist – understanding of reality is not as ‘universal’ as Feenberg 
appears to suggest. 
Feenberg’s contention that ‘[t]echnical objects have a foot in two worlds’303 may be 
further differentiated by recognizing that they have a foot in three worlds – that is, in 
‘the’ objective world, ‘our’ normative world, and ‘my’ subjective world. Such a triadic 
understanding of the ways in which humans engage in the construction of reality by 
virtue of technology accounts for the fact that they are simultaneously immersed in the 
physical world of facts and properties, the social world of norms and conventions, and 
the personal world of intentions and projections. To be clear, while it may be possible to 
distinguish these three spheres of engagement with the world at a conceptual level, they 
overlap with and depend on one another at the ontological level: 
1. Our objective situatedness in the world is impregnated with a multiplicity of 
normative codes and subjective perceptions, upon which we rely to define our 
place in the universe. 
2. Our normative construction of the world is inconceivable without our ability to 
draw on a sense of realism, when presupposing the existence of objective con- 
stellations, and a sense of perspectivism, when interpreting and engaging with 
these constellations from a subjective standpoint. 
3. Our subjective experience of the world hinges on our embeddedness in both 
objective and normative realms of existence. 
 
A comprehensive theory of function needs to take these three levels of existential 
immersion in the world into consideration.304 
 
Causality and culture 
One may have doubts as to whether Feenberg’s distinction between technique and 
technologies305 is useful (and tenable), especially in light of the fact that he characterizes 
the former as neutral/objective (‘applications of knowledge of nature’) and the latter as 
combinational/relational (‘greater than the sums of their parts’).306 An obvious objec- 
tion would be that there is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ technique. For all 
applications of (seemingly objective) knowledge of nature are embedded in both norma- 
tively and subjectively mediated criteria underlying our purposive engagement with the 
world. Of course, Feenberg is aware of this, warning that a ‘purely mechanical explana- 
tion of technology leads to na¨ıve instrumentalism or technological determinism’.307 
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What is problematic in this respect, however, is his distinction between causality and 
culture: 
 
Causality and culture intersect in functionality. I am aware that in one common definition 
culture would encompass knowledge of causal relations [ ..  . ]. Rather than pausing to 
clarify this terminology issue, I will assume a more or less common sense understanding 
of the terms.308 
 
In his ‘double-aspect theory of technology’,309 which seeks to overcome the Cartesian 
mind–body dualism, body and mind are conceived of as intrinsically entangled. Yet, his 
distinction between ‘causality’ and ‘culture’ is questionable to the extent that it reflects a 
false dichotomy – that is, a dichotomy that reinforces the kind of dualistic thinking that 
Feenberg sets out to overcome. In the realm of human interactions, causality is as 
permeated by culture as objectivity is pervaded by normativity and subjectivity; at the 
same time, culture is as permeated by causality as normativity and subjectivity are 
pervaded by objectivity. 
In a dualist manner, Feenberg affirms that ‘[t]he understanding of functionalization 
splits along two axes, causal and cultural aspects, and objective and subjective 
aspects’.310 Thus, not only does he construct a false dichotomy between ‘causal’ and 
‘cultural’, but he also erroneously conflates the former with ‘objective’ and the latter 
with ‘subjective’ dimensions. In the human world, however, both causality and culture 
have objective, normative, and subjective components. What critical theorists need to 
shed light on when examining the role of technology in society is not the interaction of 
‘causal and cultural principles’311 but, rather, the confluence of objective, normative, 
and subjective factors, without which there would be no such thing as human life forms. 
 
 
Commodification 
Feenberg maintains that commodification processes involve four key principles: alien- 
ability, excludability, rivalry, and standardization.312 This account is problematic, how- 
ever, in that the last principle – that is, standardization – does not always form part of 
commodification processes. Consider, for instance, Boltanski and Esquerre’s recent 
proposal of a ‘distinctive pragmatics of value-setting’,313 which is based on four forms 
of valorization,314 whose ‘relationships can be articulated as a set of transformations’315: 
 
1. the ‘standard form’,316 which is vital to industrial economies and which allows 
for the possibility of mass production; 
2. the ‘collection form’,317 which prevails in enrichment economies and which is 
based on a narrative attached to an object’s past; 
3. the ‘trend form’,318 which is crucial to fashion economies and whose principal 
reference points are contemporary high-profile individuals, such as present-day 
celebrities; and 
4. the ‘asset form’,319 which is preponderant in financial economies and which is 
driven by the incentive to resell objects for a profit at some point in the future. 
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Crucially, the ‘collection form’ is a commodity, but it does not necessarily involve 
‘standardization’ as a principle. On the contrary, collection items (such as paintings, 
drawings, etc.) often derive their commodity value from escaping the homogenizing 
logic of the ‘standard form’. This is just one obvious example that illustrates that Feen- 
berg would be well advised to revise his four-dimensional account of commodification, 
which, in its current form, applies to industrial economies, but not necessarily to enrich- 
ment economies.320 
 
Emancipation 
It is surprising that Feenberg states that early critical theorists – such as Horkheimer, 
Adorno, and Marcuse – have argued for ‘the possibility of another form of rationality 
that would fulfill the dream of enlightenment without its destructive consequences’.321 
The whole point of Adorno and Horkheimer’s famous analysis of ‘the dialectic of 
Enlightenment’322 is to uncover the ‘ambivalence of modernity’.323 On this view, mod- 
ernity’s emancipatory potential, although it does exist, can never be fully realized. One 
need not be a postmodernist to concede that the pursuit of various metanarratives under- 
lying ‘the dream of enlightenment’ is an ambivalent affair reflected in both progressive 
and regressive developments experienced in the era of modernity. Adorno’s notion of 
‘negative dialectics’324 is an attempt to transcend mechanical notions of human eman- 
cipation, based on the na¨ıve belief in the allegedly evolutionary force of the interplay 
between ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’ resulting in a ‘synthesis’ as the guarantee of civiliza- 
tional progress. In short, from an Adornian perspective, there is no such thing as the 
ultimate fulfilment of the dream of Enlightenment by virtue of an emancipatory form of 
rationality. 
What remains is the certainty that emancipation remains forever uncertain – and 
potentially non-emancipatory. Feenberg is right to remind us that ‘a world and a sub- 
jectivity narrowed down to the measure of technique cannot fulfill human potentials’.325 
Indeed, he captures this idea very eloquently when stating that, within the boundaries of 
the technosystem, a process is unleashed which ‘both generates a potential and represses 
it’.326 In a Luka´csian spirit, Feenberg provides a powerful account of the tension-laden 
fact that ‘[w]hat human beings can become is laid out in their relations within the reified 
system, but only as potentiality, not as actuality’.327 Thus, the other certainty with which 
we are confronted is that, under conditions of quasi-permanent reification, the potenti- 
ality of human fulfilment can hardly become an actuality. 
Just as CT ‘has always been based on utopian hopes’,328 it has always been wary of 
utopian projects. Its understanding of history is indeed ‘progressive, or at least poten- 
tially so’.329 At the same time, however, it is suspicious of overly confident, and mono- 
lithically defined, agendas claiming to bring about universal emancipation. 
Paradoxically, then, CT’s utopianism is anti-utopian. Its commitment to exploring ‘alter- 
natives to both the existing society and the failed revolutions of the past’330 can be met 
only by accepting that ‘the many local narratives’331 of people’s lifeworlds are irredu- 
cible to ‘the grand narrative’332 of world history. The transcendental scope of the latter is 
nothing without the immanent power of the former. Technology is a universal (that is, 
species-constitutive) force applied in particular (that is, spatiotemporally contingent) 
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contexts. Its normative ambivalence derives from the fact that technology can be used in 
both empowering and disempowering, progressive and regressive, liberating and repres- 
sive, emancipatory and retrograde ways. 
 
Summary 
Feenberg’s book demonstrates the pivotal role that the technosystem plays in shaping 
contemporary society. His study, regardless of its weaknesses and limitations, is a 
powerful reminder of the fact that a truly critical theory of society needs to grapple with 
the ubiquitous presence of technology – not only in the context of modernity but, more 
generally, throughout the course of human history. Whatever the future may hold in 
store, the technosystem is here to stay. Feenberg has provided us with a comprehensive, 
balanced, and inspiring account of both its perils and its opportunities. 
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